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Abstract
Nudges have become a popular tool for behaviour change; but, some interventions 
fail to replicate, even when the identical, previously successful intervention is used. 
One cause of this problem is that people default to using some of or all of the previ-
ously-successful existing nudges for any problem—the “kitchen sink” approach. We 
argue that the success of an intervention depends on understanding people’s current 
behaviour and beliefs to ensure that any nudge will actually “budge” them from their 
current beliefs. We introduce the Beliefs–Barriers–Context model, with three com-
ponents: understanding beliefs, barriers, and context to change behaviour through 
a budge. Designing a budge has the goal of identifying the psychological mecha-
nism that drives a target behaviour, focusing on the psychology of the target popu-
lation before attempting to change that behaviour. In contrast to the “kitchen sink” 
approach, budges are best complemented with mechanism experiments to identify 
what undergirds behaviour change. Moving away from simply nudging behaviour to 
budging minds—by understanding beliefs, barriers and context—has the potential to 
inform both the successes and failures of behavioural interventions.
Keywords Nudges · Budges · Interventions · Behavioural insights · Behavioural 
science
Experiments sometimes fail to replicate; while there are many reasons for such fail-
ures, of course, we focus on one reason that has become particularly important but 
has also been underappreciated amidst the rise of field experiments conducted by 
behavioural insights units in governments and organizations: the role of context. For 
example, in a widely-cited study, (N. J. Goldstein et al. 2008) showed that providing 
hotel guests in the United States with information that 75% of hotel guests reused 
their towels increased reuse. A few years later, however, in a well-powered replica-
tion, Bohner and Schlüter (2014) found that providing hotel guests in Germany with 
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the same social norm information had no effect. So, do social norms change behav-
iour? One critical piece of context sheds light on this question: as it turns out, overall 
towel reuse was quite low in the U.S. sample (in the 30% and 40% range) whereas 
reuse was quite high in the German sample (in the 70% to 80% range)1 (Bohner 
and Schlüter 2014). As a result, the 75% figure represented a dramatically different 
social norm in the U.S. setting, but simply reflected common practice in the German 
setting. We use this example of two well-designed and executed experiments for two 
reasons. First, a social norms intervention (or any nudge) does not simply “work”; 
the success of such an intervention depends critically on understanding people’s 
current behaviour; and second, efforts to change behaviour (to nudge people) can 
be informed by careful consideration of the psychology of the underlying popula-
tion—understanding people’s underlying (conscious or unconscious) beliefs in order 
to ensure that any nudge will actually “budge” them from their current beliefs. In 
short, we hope to help those wishing to influence a particular behaviour first under-
stand what needs to be budged, which will then help them pick the correct nudge (or 
nudges) for that context and population, rather than trying nudges at random—or, 
as is often the case, simply trying all of them (often referred to, informally, as the 
“kitchen sink” approach).2
Behavioural science has taken the academic, policy and business worlds by storm: 
the notion that small changes in the decision environment can have sizeable effects 
on behaviour received notable attention in academic and popular outlets (Ariely 
2008; Kahneman 2011; Thaler and Sunstein 2008). For example, the Behavioural 
Insights Team, established in 2010 in the UK Cabinet Office, demonstrated that 
the timeliness of tax payments can be affected by the mere mention of the level of 
descriptive social norms (Cialdini 1987; Hallsworth et al. 2016, 2017). Behavioural 
science units around the world have been established inside governments and corpo-
rations, and examples of effective behavioural interventions abound: from reducing 
1 This obviously implies that the policy problem (e.g. insufficient towel reuse, or even recycling in gen-
eral) is smaller in Germany than in the US, and it begs the question when and where nudge (or budge) 
interventions are more effective—when the problem is still large and even small changes can lead to 
sizeable improvements (“low hanging fruit”) or when the policy problem is smaller but the scope is more 
defined? Future research will need to disentangle those effects, but current scholarship (and anecdotal 
evidence) might suggest that nudge strategies are more commonly employed for the former case.
2 We do not want to imply that interventions in practice (e.g. at the many behavioural insights units 
around the world) are chosen completely at random, or without any consideration. In fact, often behav-
ioural insights units have accumulated substantially amounts of knowledge of which interventions typi-
cally work based on their well-powered trials, and they sometimes also pre-test interventions in smaller, 
online samples before launching them more widely (Halpern 2015).
 Unfortunately, however, these insights are often turned into a “kitchen sink” intervention: based on 
the wealth of prior trials conducted, a “super condition” is constructed which contains multiple nudges 
which have worked in the past and might work in this situation, too. Sadly, these super conditions some-
times do not work as expected, but it cannot be determined why, given that multiple nudges confound the 
pathway—and even when they do work, little can be said about why for the same reason. Thus, we argue 
that even such seemingly practical, empirical approaches fall short on understanding the drivers behind 
the behaviour (change) and thus make it hard to generalise.
 Of note, we think many behavioural insights units are in an excellent position to run highly-powered 
trials that can be generalised, in part by considering the BBC model and by running “mechanism experi-
ments” which we explain further below.
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unethical behaviour by placing signature boxes at the top of forms (Shu et al. 2012) 
to increasing voter turnout through increased accountability (Rogers et al. 2016) to 
encouraging people to engage in preventive health measures (Milkman et al. 2011).
These successes suggest that behaviourally-informed approached can be effec-
tive and beneficial for society and individuals—especially compared to more costly, 
alternative policy tools. Indeed, a recent analysis of behavioural compared to tradi-
tional policy interventions recommends that governments should further invest in 
the former as the most cost-effective policy-making tool (Benartzi et al. 2017). At 
the same time, behavioural interventions can begin to seem like a hodgepodge of 
interesting but unrelated—or even incoherent—findings, a common problem when 
academic disciplines are in their infancy. Practitioners routinely rely on published 
interventions shown to be effective in a university laboratory setting (or, wherever 
available, in a natural field setting) and implement the same (or very similar) inter-
vention in a field experiment. Most of these early implementations have focused on 
the practical hurdles to overcome when designing and implementing a behavioural 
intervention in a randomized field experiment (Hauser et al. 2017; Hauser and Luca 
2015; Haynes et al. 2012; List 2006; Podsakoff and Podsakoff 2018), but few have 
provided decision rules to decide when to use what type of intervention.
Consider the useful “MINDSPACE” and “EAST” frameworks (Dolan et al. 2012; 
The Behavioural Insights Team 2014), where each letter in each stands for a factor 
useful to consider in designing an intervention (e.g. “T” in EAST: timeliness of the 
intervention; “M” in MINDSPACE: the messenger who conveys the intervention). 
These guides are certainly helpful and will continue to aid practitioners and aca-
demics alike but they have also had an unintended side effect. Not all contexts or 
interventions require “checking off” each letter of the acronym. That is, despite the 
authors’ intentions, many practitioners may use these frameworks to hope to design 
the “best” interventions by checking off each of the letters in the acronym, believing 
that more is better. Indeed, people have been shown to have a tendency to “com-
plete” any arbitrary set (e.g. continue working on a task until a pie chart tracking 
performance is full; see (Barasz et al. 2017)), so checking off every letter may seem 
like a good idea at the time, but further contributes to the “kitchen sink” approach 
which is no longer tailored to a specific context or problem. Here we argue for a 
complementary approach: providing practitioners and academics to a systematic 
decision rule (the BBC model) to identify where the problem lies before jumping to 
designing an intervention based on these acronyms (although we continue to believe 
that these acro.
1  The BBC model
We suggest that one solution to this issue is to move from first thinking which of 
the existing toolkit of interventions to apply—from social norms (Cialdini and Trost 
1998; Hauser et  al. 2018; Luca and Hauser 2016) to defaults (Jachimowicz et  al. 
2019) to anchoring (Furnham and Boo 2011)—to first thinking about the under-
lying psychology of the target population, and the underlying psychology of the 
target problem. To oversimply, whereas nudges have tended to focus on changing 
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behaviour, we suggest focusing first on the psychological mechanisms likely to be 
at play in a given population in a given context—one such method could be to first 
understand minds in order to budge minds, and thereby nudge behaviour. We intro-
duce an adaptive framework for designing effective behavioural nudges, using what 
we term “budges.” We call this framework “Beliefs-Barriers-Context Model” (or 
“BBC Model”) which includes three parameters essential for designing a success-
ful intervention, or budge (see Fig. 1). The three parameters should not be viewed 
in order of execution or importance, which will differ depending on the context, the 
population, and the problem.
The first parameter “B” refers to gaining a deep understanding the existing beliefs 
in the target population. What do people currently believe about the behaviour tar-
geted for change, and are those beliefs accurate or inaccurate? Would changing 
those beliefs meaningfully affect the subsequent behaviour of interest? For example, 
past research has found that people hold inaccurate beliefs about the distribution of 
incomes in the United States, Australia and elsewhere and prefer a much more equal 
distribution of incomes (Hauser and Norton 2017; Hauser et al. 2016; Kiatpongsan 
and Norton 2014; Norton and Ariely 2011). It thus seems plausible that correct-
ing those beliefs could affect preferences for redistribution and subsequent behav-
iour; indeed, (Kuziemko et al. 2015) find that preference for the estate tax are shifted 
towards more redistribution when people have their inaccurate beliefs corrected.
Note that the beliefs that shape our behaviour need not always be “conscious” 
or fully accessible to our cognition: since much of our decision-making hap-
pens automatically (Kahneman 2011), has been shaped by our experience and 
repeated actions (Aarts et  al. 1998) and even through ecological adaptation (Gig-
erenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; Goldstein and Gigerenzer 2002), beliefs sometimes 
form after behaviour has occurred. Indeed, when we make decisions without going 
through a deliberate thought process, we sometimes retrospectively bring in line our 
belief system with our actions after they have occurred (Ariely and Norton 2008). 
For example, many people might subconsciously form beliefs about the extent of 
income inequality in the country by, for instance, frequently observing their local 
environment and the extent to which they notice poverty on their way to commute 
(Sheehy-Skeffington et al. 2016). While they might not consciously be aware of this 
belief-generation process, those beliefs around poverty likely form an important part 
of any future (conscious) decision-making process involving taxation or charitable 
giving. In fact, such subconscious beliefs might lead to a (cognitive) barrier, making 
the person unwilling to change their behaviour—this brings us to the second param-
eter of the BBC model.
The second “B” parameter stands for understanding barriers: are there are obvi-
ous (or less obvious) barriers in the way of a desired behaviour change? Removing 
barriers might be the first step to initiate behaviour change. One well-known exam-
ple of a structural barrier to behaviour change in the context of healthy eating is 
that unhealthy foods are often placed in highly visible and convenient locations in 
cafeterias—tempting eaters to indulge. Removing this barrier to healthy eating—by 
placing foods such as fruits and vegetables in those convenient places—alters eat-
ing habits for the better (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Another example is the avail-
ability and ease of access to other opportunities in life: for instance, adolescents 
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in disadvantaged schools in Chicago who were offered minimum-wage jobs for 
8 weeks during the summer were less likely to be arrested for violent crimes during 
and even after the job programme. By removing a structural barrier to entry, youths 
were able to gain access to, and learn about, the labour market as well as had an 
opportunity develop social skills, self-efficacy, and perceived control, which had a 
long-lasting effect on their behaviour (Heller 2014).
The final letter “C” stands for understanding the context: the physical and social 
setting in which a behaviour takes place. Much has been written in sociology, organ-
isational behaviour, and other social sciences about the importance of context; we 
B B C
Beliefs:
• What do people
believe about the
behaviour
(change)?
• Are those beliefs
accurate or not?
• Would changing
those beliefs have
an effect?
Barriers:
• Are there structural
barriers in the way
of behaviour
change?
• Would removing
those barriers
enable behaviour
change?
Context:
• Is context similar to
past examples?
• What is unique
about this context?
• How does the
current context
shape the
appropriateness of
the nudge?
Budge
• Is derived from understanding beliefs, barriers and context
• Goes beyond checklists and the “kitchen sink” approach
• Identifies one or more mechanisms that affect behavior change
• Is testable through a “mechanism field experiment” which explicitly
tests the proposed mechanism that turns the effect on or off
• Informs future interventions by drawing generalizable conclusions
Understanding
Fig. 1  Designing a budge following the “BBC framework”: understanding the pre-existing beliefs about 
the behaviour, the barriers in the way of a behaviour change, and the context in which the behaviour 
occurs
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refer the interested reader to (Cappelli and Sherer 1991; Johns 2006; Mowday and 
Sutton 1993) for a comprehensive overview. Taking the time to fully understand a 
given context requires in-depth research, often combining more than one research 
method including qualitative and inductive methodologies (Chatman and Flynn 
2005). Understanding context can radically shift the prior of the likelihood that a 
given intervention will succeed, and also helps to refine the types of interventions 
that are most likely to resonate psychologically and result in behaviour change. For 
instance, evidence that context matters can be illustrated with a highly successful 
nudge: Shu et  al. (2012) demonstrate that placing a signature box at the top of a 
form highlights an ethical “self-image” and reduced cheating on the form subse-
quently. This intervention has been replicated in other settings successfully (Con-
gdon and Shankar 2015). However, it has also not replicated in other settings (e.g. 
(Bhanot 2017a; Kettle et al. 2017)): the moderating factor for this nudge seems to 
be one type of context, such that signatures that were collected digitally actually 
increased unethical behaviour, while traditional signatures made by hand decreased 
unethical behaviour (Chou 2015).
We argue that the BBC model is a first step towards a comprehensive nudge the-
ory. By focusing on beliefs and barriers, the framework is adaptable and general 
enough to apply for the design of most nudges, turning them into budges. Moreover, 
considering—and making changes to fit—the context not only increases the feasibil-
ity and likely success of an intervention, but also gives theoretical depth to the find-
ings by taking moderating factors into account.
2  Budges
Use of the BBC model is intended to result in effective budges. Whereas nudges 
refer to an intervention that addresses a target behaviour in a specific population in a 
specific context, budges are meant to help understand the generalisable mechanisms 
that can then be flexibly adapted to different contexts, behaviours, and populations. 
The BBC model is well-suited to designing budges because of two of the param-
eters in the model which target the underlying causes of (lack of) behaviour change: 
inaccurate beliefs about the behaviour (change) and structural barriers in the way of 
behaviour change.3
We suggest that researchers would benefit greatly by exploring budges through 
the use of “mechanism experiments” (Ludwig et  al. 2011): designing an experi-
ment that explicitly tests the proposed underlying psychological mechanism of the 
behaviour can demonstrate whether the proposed mechanism is indeed the driver of 
behaviour. As just one example, even an effective application of social norms that 
3 Arguably, structural barriers could be viewed as part of each unique context. We do not disagree with 
this possibility but we think that some barriers have properties that span different contexts, which makes 
focusing on the barrier separately worthwhile. For instance, a structural barrier to citizens’ compli-
ance might be that a required form is complicated to access or hard to find on the government website; 
whether the context is taxes payments or unemployment claims is likely less important than the cross-
context barrier that the form is hard to locate.
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changes behaviour may be due to a number of different causes: it might make people 
realize that the behaviour is more prevalent than they believed, it might change their 
sense that the behaviour is endorsed or moral, or may change their belief about how 
difficult the behaviour is to enact (the barriers). The results of a “mechanism experi-
ment” to test which budge is driving behaviour are insightful in understanding the 
problem and solution better—even in the case of null findings.
To illustrate the potential of budges, consider again the use of social norms, but 
in the context of reducing household energy consumption. Social norm interventions 
have been highly successful, such as in bringing forward late tax payments by show-
ing peers’ timely payments (Hallsworth et  al. 2017), decreasing the prevalence of 
unethical behaviour when interacting with government services (Hauser et al. 2018), 
and reducing energy and water usage by comparing nearby household usage (Allcott 
2011; Allcott and Rogers 2014; Bhanot 2017b; Jachimowicz et al. 2018), but have 
not always worked successfully (e.g. (Silva and John 2017; Verkooijen et al. 2015)). 
How then can someone interested in changing a given behaviour in a given popula-
tion in a given context know whether a social norm intervention will be effective in 
a new setting?
In our experience, choosing which nudge to implement has largely been a mat-
ter of the existing evidence that a nudge worked in some other context. That is, if 
the same nudge has not been applied in the current context, the question quickly 
becomes: what is the most similar context where it did work? While this may be 
a useful strategy for some cases, it can also lead to looking very far afield for new 
context. In contrast, the starting point for budges is different: the question is whether 
and how a social norm intervention would affect the underlying psychology of the 
target population. In other words, it works by starting with the individual perspec-
tive, moving up to the specific context—rather than take insights from one macro-
level context to another. For example, one predictor of the effectiveness of social 
norm interventions is that they convey new information to a decision-maker, in par-
ticular about their own behaviour relative to that of their peers (Schultz et al. 2007). 
If a social norm intervention would be likely to manipulate the beliefs people have 
about their and others behaviour, a social norm nudge might be applicable; if not, it 
is less likely to be effective.
In the case of household energy consumption, then, at least two relevant “beliefs” 
question could be asked4: first, do households know how much energy they use and 
if not, would showing them this information reduce energy usage; and second (and 
separately from the first question), do they have an accurate belief about what is a 
“reasonable” amount to use and if they do not, would telling them what others are 
using change their reference point for what is reasonable? (Note that an alternative 
question focusing on the barrier component of the BBC model might be to ask if 
there is a high “barrier” in place to households knowing their energy usage; if this is 
4 There are likely other beliefs that could be of interest. For example, (Jachimowicz et al. 2018) show 
that social norms to reduce energy consumption depends in part on the decision-makers’ beliefs about 
their neighbours’ beliefs of the importance on sustainable behaviour (“second-order beliefs”). This sug-
gests that higher-order beliefs can also be influenced to nudge behaviour.
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believed to be what needs to be budged, it would likely lead to a different proposed 
budge. For simplicity, below we focus on the beliefs component.)
These two components to the “beliefs” parameters are related but distinct mech-
anisms. A typical “kitchen sink” intervention would attempt to affect both beliefs 
simultaneously, which may increase the likelihood that the nudge will change 
behaviour but may make the reason why opaque—which can in some cases lead to 
incorrect inferences about what caused the behaviour change, in turn leading to inef-
fective future nudges. Instead, both budges can be simply tested by an experiment 
with four treatments in a two-by-two design: a control condition with no descriptive 
energy consumption behaviour, one with information about the focal household’s 
energy consumption, one with information about the household’s peers’ energy con-
sumption, and one with both the household’s own and their peers’ consumption. If a 
household’s energy consumption alone matters, most of the energy reduction would 
be observed in the second treatment relative to the first (i.e. the budge is effectively 
an “information only” treatment without the social component); if it is information 
about peers that matters (i.e. the intervention is almost exclusively “social”), the 
third treatment would be more successful; and if both play a role, the fourth treat-
ment would be most successful. At minimum, consideration of the likely beliefs of 
the population can help in designing an intervention that targets the belief most in 
need of being changed, while not spending time and money attempting to influence 
a belief that does not need to be budged.5
Why, however, should a policy-maker bother running such a laborious experi-
ment, when it is often virtually costless to add both types of information to the inter-
vention from the start? We believe there are at least two reasons for avoiding the 
“kitchen sink” approach. On a theoretical basis, it is important to be able to distin-
guish between the two types of information because it helps understand what drives 
the effect. As we have argued above, this understanding is key to generalise insights 
for future trials and interventions (for further discussion, we recommend (Ludwig 
et al. 2011)’s excellent “mechanism experiment” paper).
But there is also a practical reason for not combining multiple nudges into one 
intervention lightly: despite the common intuition that “more is better”, this does 
not apply to simply combining nudges to change behaviour for the better—in fact, 
sometimes “more” can lead to worse outcomes. For instance, the Behavioural 
Insights Team ran a trial to increase organ donations after the annual car registration 
process. They varied the message that encouraged citizens to sign up to the organ 
donor register, relative to a control group without such a message. The best perform-
ing message, relative to control, was a message that invoked a sense of reciprocity; 
among other messages that did well was, yet again, a social norm message that many 
other people have signed up to the organ donor register. What happened when the 
5 To the best of our knowledge, a very similar experiment was run by the economists at Opower several 
years ago and they have continued to run randomised controlled trials to evaluate the performance of 
social norms in most of their new programmes since then, focusing primarily on the comparison between 
one’s own energy usage and one’s own usage plus neighbours’ usage (Allcott 2011; Allcott and Rogers 
2014; Jachimowicz et al. 2018).
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social norm message was further “enhanced” with a nice-looking picture of a group 
of people, to further emphasise the social aspect of the intervention? Unexpectedly, 
this intervention significantly reduced sign-ups below the control group sign-up rate 
(The Behavioural Insights Team 2015).
There are at least two lessons to be learned from this trial. First, combining differ-
ent nudges will not always yield superior results and may sometimes even backfire. 
In this case, adding a picture to an otherwise successful intervention did not just 
cancel out the effect of the effective nudge, but also led to a welfare loss. In other 
words, while it may be costless to include more nudges in an intervention, it may be 
costly to do so with regards to the desired outcome.
Second, this trial allows us to disentangle the effect of the social norm—which 
is good news and close to a mechanism experiment, which we have advocated for. 
However, it falls short in giving us fill insight into what drives all the results by not 
also including a condition with just a picture. Without this condition, we cannot tell 
whether the picture itself would have also led to lower sign up rates, or if the com-
bination of social norms and picture is particularly harmful. To increase our under-
standing of “what works” and provide insights into future trials where social norms, 
pictures, and many other nudges may become relevant again, it would have been 
most useful to have the full experimental design with the missing cell (i.e. picture 
alone) included.
3  Limitations
Budges, we argue, are a form of intervention that systematically considers beliefs, 
barriers and context to create behaviour change. However, of course, we do not 
argue that all nudges will need to become “budges”—not every intervention will 
need to address beliefs, barriers and context, and we do not want the BBC model to 
become another “check list.” Rather, we see this framework as an opportunity to ask 
whether the researcher or policy-maker has a good grasp of the problem at hand and 
understands what it might take to change behaviour.
For example, targeting beliefs will be most helpful when the researcher has rea-
son to believe that the target audience has received incorrect information and would 
change its mind (and potentially behaviour) if they had access to alternative infor-
mation. For example, information about the prevalence of a prosocial behaviour in 
the community (e.g. descriptive social norms of others’ donation amounts) is an 
example of shifting beliefs by providing previously hidden information and conse-
quently changing behaviour (Shang and Croson 2009).
There are, however, plenty of cases where this might not be the case—that is, sit-
uations where one’s beliefs would not be shifted or updated even if an intervention 
would provide new and relevant information. For example, people are motivated to 
avoid receiving information about charitable causes to have an excuse not to give 
(Exley and Petrie 2018) or they selectively seek and reinforce exposure to news out-
lets with politically aligned values, even when they are given other information from 
other sources (Garrett 2009).
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In short, the BBC model does not provide a checklist or a recipe of “ingredi-
ents to include” which always apply—instead, we offer a systematic approach to 
understanding what drives behaviour change, of which beliefs, barriers and contexts 
are common elements. However, a complete theory of behaviour change should, of 
course, recognise that behaviour is likely influenced by a myriad of factors, includ-
ing but not limited to beliefs, structural barriers, context, available information, 
framing, cognitive limitations, and traditional economic considerations, such as 
prices and income effects.
4  Conclusion
We propose a complementary process to the typical design of behavioural nudges, 
which we hope will offer researchers, policy-makers and organizations guidance on 
how best to select and design relevant nudges for their population, problem, and 
context—rather than throw the kitchen sink of nudges at every problem. The BBC 
model we propose has three components—understanding beliefs, barriers, and con-
text—which help identify what beliefs need to be budged in order for behaviour to 
be nudged.
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